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“general applicability”. FCA similarly
contends that the District’s policy allows
for unfettered discretionary exceptions,
even though the District’s policy does
not on its face allow for exceptions and
explicitly states that it applies to all
ASB student groups. As a result, Judge
Gilliam concludes that FCA has failed to
clearly prove their argument.
In their last argument, FCA believes
the District’s policy has been selectively
enforced in violation and cites examples
of clubs which have been “allowed”
regardless of their restrictions on
membership and leadership. The FCA
plays a game of pointing fingers, listing
clubs that appear based on their names
to have restrictive requirements, such as
the Girls Who Code club, the Big Sister/
Little Sister club, the Girls Circle club,
and the Simone club, contending that all
have been allowed to select members
and leaders on the basis of sex. The
District quickly and briefly explains
the situation, stating that some of these
clubs, while hinting at a restrictive
membership, are quite open and have
male members in leadership, regardless
of the name of the club. Others, such as
the Simone Club and the Girls Circle
club, are not ASB-recognized groups.
The District also contends that even
if FCA were to show past selective
enforcement, it has implemented new
policies to ensure compliance. As a
result, FCA has failed to back their
claim of selective enforcement.
To complete his analysis, Judge
Gilliam reviews the remaining two
Winter factors – irreparable harm and
the balance of equities/public interest.
Following Supreme Court precedent,
when the government is a party to a
case, the balance of equities and public
interest factors are to be combined. As
for irreparable injuries, the judge states
that any violation of a First Amendment
right, no matter how minute, constitutes
irreparable harm. Should the District
be found to be in violation of FCA’s
constitutional rights and the EAA, they
will subsequently be deemed to have
caused irreparable harm. For balance
of equities and public interest, the
court rules the balance does not tip in
FCA’s favor after weighing the First
Amendment complaints as well as the

costs to exclusion faced by students
subject to FCA’s exclusionary behavior.
Judge Gilliam’s opinion is thorough
and detailed. He concludes that FCA
has not met its burden of proof for
requesting a preliminary injunction.
FCA has filed an appeal with the Ninth
Circuit. It will be very interesting to
see how the Ninth Circuit handles this
appeal, as several of the cases cited
within this opinion are Ninth Circuit
cases with incredibly similar facts
and results. But, as shown by recent
Supreme Court rulings, precedent is
not always binding, and facts may be
distinguished between cases. The Ninth
Circuit, once a liberal stronghold, has
shifted in a more conservative direction
thanks to Donald Trump, who appointed
ten judges to the circuit in four years
(compared to only seven by President
Obama in eight years).
The extensive list of counsel
representing the parties and amici spans
nearly two pages of the opinion in the
LEXIS version. Most notably, the Becket
Fund for Religious Liberty and affiliated
counsel represent the FCA student
groups from the three high schools,
and amicus briefs were filed on behalf
of groups advocating separation of
church and as well as religious freedom
groups. Judge Gilliam was appointed by
President Barack Obama. ■
Jason Miranda is a law student at New
York Law School (class of 2024).

Supreme Court
Overruling of Roe
v. Wade Poses
Danger for LGBT
Rights
By Arthur S. Leonard
On June 24, the Supreme Court
ruled 5-4 in Dobbs v. Jackson
Women’s Health Organization, 2022
WL 2276808, 2022 U.S. LEXIS 3057,
that “the Constitution does not confer
a right to abortion.” Justice Samuel
Alito’s opinion for a five-member
majority of the Court, which did not
change in any material way from the
draft leaked earlier this year, embraces
the “originalist” contention that the 14th
Amendment, adopted in 1868, means
what the generation that adopted it
thought that it meant, as evidenced
by the legal status of abortion at that
time. Chief Justice Roberts did not
sign the majority opinion, writing
separately to concur in the judgment
that the Mississippi law at issue was
unconstitutional, but not agreeing to
overrule Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) or Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1993), outright.
The case concerns a Mississippi
law that prohibits abortions where the
“probable gestational age of the unborn
human being has been determined to
be greater than fifteen (15) weeks,”
except in a “medical emergency” or in
the case of a “severe fetal abnormality.”
The district court (379 F.3d 549) and
the 5th Circuit (945 F.3d 265) correctly
construed existing precedents to make
this law unconstitutional because
it prohibited abortions prior to the
viability of the fetus (i.e., developed
to the point where it could survive
independently), so the state was enjoined
from enforcing it while the case
proceeded. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in an interlocutory appeal
from the preliminary injunction to
determine whether it is unconstitutional
to prohibit abortions at any time before
the point of viability.
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Although the cert petition contended
that the case could be decided without
overruling existing precedents, it
also suggested that this would be an
appropriate case in which to “revisit”
the Court’s abortion precedents. Once
the case got to the merits briefing
stage and oral argument, the state
was arguing that resolving this case
required determining whether a
pregnant woman’s right to have an
abortion is constitutionally protected,
the Solicitor General, representing the
federal government, agreed with that
contention, and Justice Alito’s opinion
does not address whether the case
could be decided without determining
whether Roe v. Wade should be
overruled.
Under the Court’s reasoning, because
the Constitution does not explicitly
mention abortion, the question whether
it can be interpreted as protecting
a woman’s right to terminate her
pregnancy depends on the language of
the 14th Amendment (text) and how it
would be understood in 1868. As of then,
Alito contended, abortion was either
criminalized or considered unlawful in
most of the states, so a right to have an
abortion could not be considered part
of the “liberty” protected by the Due
Process Clause of the 14th Amendment,
under which the test he discerned from
caselaw was “whether the right at issue
in this case is rooted in our Nation’s
history and tradition and whether it is
an essential component of what we have
described as ‘ordered liberty.’”
Alito’s approach to applying this
test follows the brand of originalism
promoted by the late Justice Antonin
Scalia, who responded to the progressive
view that the Constitution needs to be
reinterpreted for modern times – called
the “Living Constitution” doctrine – by
stating that the Constitution was “dead,
dead, dead” in the sense that its meaning
was fixed at the time it was adopted.
Although elements of originalism of
this brand have shown up from time
to time in opinions by the justices,
Alito’s opinion in Dobbs (and Thomas’s
opinion a day before in Bruen, discussed
below) mark its strongest acceptance in
an opinion endorsed by a majority of
the Supreme Court.
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Responding to the government’s
argument that the Court should apply
“stare decisis,” Alito’s opinion contended
that it does not apply in this case
because Roe v. Wade, the 1973 decision
that first recognized this right, was
“egregiously” wrong, poorly reasoned,
created an unworkable approach to
the issue, and did not generate any
significant reliance interest that would
be upset by overruling it. Alito quoted
several “liberal” or “progressive” legal
scholars who wrote articles criticizing
the reasoning of Roe v. Wade, argued
that in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
decided two decades later, the Court
provided no more reasoning to support a
“viability” test for determining whether
the state could prohibit an abortion from
being performed, merely asserting it.
Much of Alito’s opinion, and a lengthy
appendix, were devoted to disputing the
historical account in the Roe decision,
which asserted that prohibitions of
abortion were not established until a
wave of 19th century legislation resulted
in statutory bans through the U.S. by
the 20th century. Alito documented
the existence of numerous state laws
banning abortions in effect in 1868
when the 14th Amendment was adopted,
and he noted that some of them did not
even provide exceptions to save the life
of the pregnant woman.
A joint dissenting opinion by Justices
Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and
Elena Kagan forcefully repudiated all
of Alito’s points at length, noting that
this is the first time in its history that
the Supreme Court has rescinded an
individual right that it had previously
recognized, and that access to abortion
plays a central role in the lives of
women, such that making it unavailable
would render women second-class
citizens. The dissent rejected the tight
tie to history as a determinative factor in
deciding whether there is a fundamental
right, in a way reminiscent of Justice
Anthony Kennedy’s opinions for the
Court in cases like Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003) and Obergefell v.
Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
Chief Justice John Roberts wrote
separately, not signing Alito’s opinion
and concurring only in the judgement
that the Mississippi law could survive

judicial review, arguing that the law
could be upheld without overruling Roe
v. Wade and Casey, by modifying those
holdings to abandon the “viability” line
(about 24 weeks). In Roberts’ view, the
Court should not overrule a precedent
outright if it is not necessary to do so
to reach the result the Court deems
appropriate in a particular case. In this
case, it was in his view possible to find
that a 15-week line, based on what is
now known about the development of a
fetus in pregnancy, is a reasonable one.
The federal government, speaking
through the Solicitor General, had
argued to the Court that overruling
Roe v. Wade would endanger such
precedents as Lawrence v. Texas, which
recognized the right of gay people to
have sex, and Obergefell v. Hodges,
which recognized the right of samesex couples to marry. Both of those
cases relied on the concept of “liberty”
protected by the Due Process Clause of
the 14th Amendment, as developed in a
series of cases over the course of the 20th
century, and both had prominently cited
Roe v. Wade and Casey as precedents
for the right to individual autonomy
in making important life decisions,
such as whether to have a child. Other
precedents that could be endangered by
the Court’s approach in this case include
Loving v. Virginia, which struck down
a state law against interracial marriage,
and Griswold v. Connecticut, which
struck down a state law prohibiting
distribution and use of contraceptives
for preventing pregnancy. Both Loving
and Griswold relied, at least in part, on
an “unenumerated” fundamental right
identified by the Court. Griswold’s Due
Process component was a particularly
important precedent for Lawrence v.
Texas, and Loving was particularly
important for Obergefell v. Hodges.
Justice Thomas signed Alito’s
opinion, but in a separate concurring
opinion he called for the Court to
“revisit” Lawrence v. Texas and
Obergefell v. Hodges in appropriate
cases. He has repeatedly described those
decisions as being wrong, as he rejects
the doctrine of substantive due process
completely, arguing that the language
of the Due Process Clause on its face
only requires procedural fairness and

regularity in cases where the state is
abridging life, liberty, or property rights.
This is not the first time he has called on
the Court to reconsider those cases, and
significantly no other justice signed on
to his opinion.
As in his leaked draft, Alito asserted
that the Court was only deciding
about abortion, which he said was a
unique subject, and stated: “Nothing
in this opinion should be understood
to cast doubt on precedents that do
not concern abortion.” He expanded
on this point in the final version of the
opinion, responding to the dissenters’
assertion that this new ruling endangers
those key LGBT rights precedents. In
addition to reasserting the uniqueness of
abortion because it involves “potential
life,” he said that there might be other
constitutional theories that could be
used to support those other decisions,
without specify what they might be.
We observe that in both Lawrence and
Obergefell, the Petitioners had made
Equal Protection arguments in addition
to Due Process arguments. In Lawrence,
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred
in the result – striking down the Texas
“Homosexual Sodomy Law – but on
equal protection rather than due process
grounds, and Justice Kennedy’s opinion
acknowledges that petitioners in that
case could mount a plausible equal
protection challenge, but that deciding
the case on Due Process grounds
was preferable. In Loving v. Virginia,
the Court principally relied on equal
protection to hold the law against
interracial marriages unconstitutional,
secondarily speaking in terms of due
process, so that the Loving case would
probably not be subject to serious
challenge based on Dobbs.
Those who fear that the Court
might immediately launch on a course
of overruling all significant past
substantive due process decisions
should note that the Supreme Court
does not spontaneously reopen cases
long ago decided in order to overrule
them. A new case has to come up to the
Court through the litigation process. In
the case of Lawrence or Obergefell, a
new case would require a state to enact a
new sodomy law or prosecute somebody
for consensual private gay sex involving

adults under an existing law not repealed
in response to Lawrence (of which
there remain several) to generate a new
case on that subject, and a state would
have to defy the Obergefell ruling and
refuse to grant licenses, or otherwise
to discriminate against existing samesex marriages, to generate a new case
to get that issue before the Court. This
might take several years to unfold, and
assuming lower courts would apply
Lawrence and Obergefell in the relevant
cases, might never reach the Court if it
sticks to this observation and refuses to
grant certiorari.
Justice
Kavanaugh
wrote
a
concurring opinion, while also signing
Alito’s opinion, emphasizing his view
that the Court’s holding is that the
Constitution is “neutral” on the subject
of abortion, but the dissenters criticized
this assertion as failing to recognize
the impact that overruling Roe and
Casey will have, in light of the recent
trend in conservative states to enact
new restrictions and bans on abortion in
anticipation of the Court’s ruling. Some
states have long since passed “trigger”
laws outlawing abortion intended to
spring into effect upon an overruling of
Roe and Casey by the Supreme Court. It
is hardly “neutral” to suddenly withdraw
a right that has been recognized for
almost 50 years.
Alito’s originalism approach in this
case contradicts a century of Supreme
Court decision-making, the dissenters
observed, and is directly inconsistent
with a series of Supreme Court opinions
starting with Roe v. Wade and extending
through half a dozen or more decisions
dealing with challenges to various state
restrictions and regulations affecting
abortion, all of which had accepted
Roe and Casey (from 1993) as settled
precedents.
Just a day earlier, Justice Clarence
Thomas took a similar “originalism”
approach in writing for a 6-3 majority
in New York State Rifle & Pistol
Association v. Bruen, 2022 U.S.
LEXIS 305, a case challenging a New
York law that required a person who
sought a license to carry arms outside
their home to show that they had some
individualized need to do so, a standard
that could not be met by a general

assertion of fearfulness from regularly
being in a high crime neighbor. Thomas
wrote for the Court that because it had
determined several years ago in Heller
that the 2nd Amendment clearly protects
an individual’s right to bear arms,
a state must apply the same license
requirements to everybody, regardless
of whether they just want to keep a
handgun in their home for self defense
or want to carry one about in public for
the same reason. Since New York did
not require people seeking a limited
license to possess a gun in their home
for purposes of self defense to show any
particularized need, wrote Thomas, it
could not impose such a requirement
on people seeking an unrestricted
license, given at the discretion of law
enforcement authorities.
The 2nd Amendment is part of the Bill
of Rights adopted in 1791. Thomas said
that it was widely recognized in 1791 for
that people could be armed in public, so
that is what the 2nd Amendment protects.
And since the right is protected based
on the 1791 meaning of the language,
the state may not infringe that right for
any individual without a substantial
justification on the state’s part. Putting
the burden on the individual to show
that they need the gun is, in the Court’s
view, unconstitutional.
This will require New York and
several other states to rethink their gun
control laws and will affect the ability of
the federal government and the states to
undertake new initiatives to protect the
public from the plague of guns.
These two cases well illustrate the
agenda of the super-charged activist
conservative majority bolstered by
Trump’s three appointments to the
Court, imposing, in a way inconsistent
with the Court’s major civil rights
precedents of the 20th century, their
backwards-looking approach to the
interpretation of a Constitution frozen
in time. ■

July 2022 LGBT Law Notes 7

